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Abstract 
This study explores the impact of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers on loan 
syndicate structure. Using a sample of 17,839 loans raised by 8,701 US firms between January 1986 and 
August 2007, we confirm existing evidence that lead arrangers form concentrated syndicates when 
borrowers require intense monitoring and due diligence. We provide new evidence regarding the roles of 
borrower reputation, lead arranger reputation and the bank-borrower relationship. First, lead arranger 
reputation can reduce information asymmetry but only for the most reputable lead arrangers. Second, 
borrower reputation, measured by the borrower’s past access of the loan market, reduces the problem of 
information asymmetry, with higher reductions for more recent and more regular borrowers. Third, our 
results regarding the past relationship between the borrower and the lead arranger support the moral 
hazard aspect of information asymmetry for all borrowers. We also find evidence for the adverse selection 
aspect of information asymmetry but only for opaque borrowers. The effect can, however, be overcome 
by the most reputable lead arrangers, as their behavior is strongly influenced by a fear of loss of 
reputation. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the effects of information asymmetry in the syndicated loan market. Due to the 
specialization of banks in the syndicate, information asymmetry manifests itself not only between bank 
and borrower – as it does in bilateral bank lending – but also among different members of the lending 
syndicate. Here, participating banks that simply lend but are otherwise passive have an information 
disadvantage over lead arrangers who arrange the loan and actively screen and monitor borrowers. This 
differentiation in the banks’ role adds complexity. When deciding whether to join the syndicate and how 
much to lend, participating banks consider not only the borrower but also the lead arranger, his reputation 
and his prior relationship with the borrower. Furthermore, syndicated lending combines characteristics of 
public financing with those of traditional bank lending (Boot, 2000). Diamond (1991) argues that 
borrowers upgrade themselves from bank loans to public debt by developing a stable credit reputation. 
Thus, syndicate structures are not only affected by information asymmetries between the different parties 
but also by the borrower’s reputation. Detailed information on syndicated loans is publicly available, 
which makes the syndicated loan market more transparent and allows us to study the intricacies of the 
syndicated loan market in depth. Because syndicated loans have become a major source of external 
finance for a variety of firms (Trust and Corporation, 2008), it is important to understand whether and 
how the relationship between borrower, lead arranger and participating banks shapes the loan contract.  
We use a sample of 17,839 syndicated loans1 raised by 8,701 US firms between January 1986 and 
August 2007 that involve 1,080 different lead arrangers. Our findings are three-fold. First, we confirm the 
non-opportunistic behavior of lead arrangers documented in the literature (Simons, 1993; Jones et al., 
2005; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Panyagometh and Roberts, 2010; Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001; Sufi, 
2007; Ross, 2010). In particular, we verify that lead arrangers syndicate out a smaller portion of the loan 
if the borrower is opaque but that more reputable lead arrangers are able to syndicate out a larger portion 
of the loan. However, our findings also indicate that this latter effect is limited to the most reputable lead 
arrangers, who are able to use their reputation as a credible commitment device with participating banks 
and thereby reduce the moral hazard problem resulting from asymmetric information between themselves 
and the participating banks. This is consistent with the findings of Ross (2010), who shows that the most 
reputable banks, e.g., those with the highest market shares, are known for their superior screening and 
monitoring abilities. Second, while we confirm that borrower reputation generally mitigates the problem 
of information asymmetry, we discover that this mitigation is stronger both statistically and economically 
for borrowers whose reputation was established relatively recently or more persistently, e.g., via frequent 
                                                            
1 We use the terms ‘loan’ and ‘deal’ interchangeably throughout the paper. Of our 17,839 loans, 27% consist of 
more than one tranche. In these cases, the multiple tranches jointly constitute the overall deal. We conduct our 
analyses on the deal level but provide tranche-level analyses as robustness checks. 
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and repeated borrowing over time. Third, the results from past relationships between borrowers and lead 
arrangers confirm the moral hazard aspect of information asymmetry for all borrowers. This moral hazard 
problem is strongest for recent bank-borrower relationships. For opaque borrowers, however, we discover 
new evidence not yet documented in the literature. In particular, we find evidence for the adverse 
selection aspect of information asymmetry, which is stronger for relatively recent relationships between 
borrowers and lead arrangers. This adverse selection aspect is driven by low-reputation lead arrangers, 
indicating that these lead arrangers – in contrast to high-reputation lead arrangers – do not fear the loss of 
reputation and are thus susceptible to adverse selection. This contrast between low- and high-reputation 
lead arrangers provides clear evidence for the important effects that reputation has on arranger behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the syndicated loan market, 
and section 3 focuses on the role and effects of information asymmetry in syndicated lending. Section 4 
elaborates on data and methodology, and section 5 presents the results of our study. Section 6 provides 
robustness checks, and section 7 summarizes our findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Syndicated Lending 
A sophisticated banking system plays a pivotal role in the economic development of a country. It spurs 
technological innovation by funding entrepreneurs with the best chances of successfully implementing 
innovative products and production processes (Levine, 1997). The banking system performs 
intermediation by accepting deposits from savers and channeling them to the borrowers for productive 
uses through lending activity (Dermirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996; Ang, 2008). If a borrower requires a 
large loan or several different tranches, these are commonly provided by a group of lenders known as a 
syndicate. A syndicated loan agreement simplifies the borrowing process, as the borrower uses one 
agreement to cover the whole group of banks and different types of tranches rather than entering into a 
series of separate bilateral loans, each with different terms and conditions. In a syndicated loan, there is 
typically one lender, known as the lead arranger, who arranges the terms and conditions of the loan in the 
form of an information memorandum. The lead arranger then invites other banks to participate in the loan. 
These participating banks are rather passive in that they fund part of the loan but rely on the lead arranger 
for the screening and monitoring of the borrower.   
Syndication allows lenders to diversify their loan portfolios and share different risks. There are 
three different types of syndication: underwritten, best efforts and club deals syndication. In underwritten 
deals, arrangers guarantee the entire commitment and then syndicate the loan. Consequently, they exhibit 
more credit risk because if the arrangers cannot fully subscribe the loan, they are forced to absorb the 
difference and sell the loan at a discount if the credit conditions deteriorate. Best efforts syndication 
entails less credit risk because arrangers commit to underwrite less than the full amount of the loan, 
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leaving the credit to the vicissitude of the market. Loan syndication, with regards to both the loan’s 
primary distribution and secondary loan trading aspects, is one of the various tools that financial 
institutions can use to take on or shed credit risk (BIS, 2003). Finally, club deals are usually small deals 
for which the borrower selects the syndicate members; hence, these types of deals typically evoke no 
relationship. These smaller syndicates result in lower restructuring and monitoring costs and are thus 
preferred by lead arrangers when default is more likely. From this perspective, greater use of club deals 
may be an indication of both growing bank risk aversion and higher credit risk (Chui et al., 2010).  
Gadanecz (2004) divides the development of the syndicated loan market into three phases. During 
the first phase, from 1971 to 1982, syndicated lending developed with governments as the main 
borrowers. This phase ended with Mexico’s sovereign default in 1982 and the payment difficulties faced 
by many emerging market borrowers in the 1980s. Mexican debt was restructured into Brady bonds in 
1989, which catalyzed a shift in patterns for emerging market borrowers toward bond financing and, in 
turn, resulted in a contraction in syndicated lending business. During the third phase, which began in the 
early 1990s, the market for syndicated loans experienced a revival and syndicated lending became a major 
source of external finance for a variety of firms (Trust & Corporation, 2008). Due to the onset of the 
current 2007 financial crisis, the syndicated loan market can be said to have entered its fourth phase, 
during which global syndicated lending fell by 41% in 2008 (Dealogic Loan Analytics, 2008; Ivashina 
and Scharfstein, 2010). 
 
3. Information Asymmetry in Syndicated Lending 
In a typical bilateral lending relationship between borrower and lender, asymmetric information manifests 
itself in the form of adverse selection and moral hazard. An adverse selection problem arises when one of 
the parties possesses private information before the loan contract has been signed. Here, the lender is not 
fully aware of the affairs of the borrower and selects a ‘bad’ borrower because of a lack of information. A 
moral hazard problem arises due to the existence of asymmetric information after the signing of the loan 
contract. The borrower begins shirking after the signature of a binding loan contract because it is not in 
the lender's control to determine borrower behavior. Banks can obtain private information by ex-ante 
screening or ex-post monitoring of the borrower. Additionally, repeated interactions between the 
borrower and the lender help to generate private information and, hence, decrease information 
asymmetry. A prolonged relationship is beneficial from the perspective of both parties. Borrowers gain 
due to the reduction in borrowing costs, the increase in the availability of credit and the easier access to 
future loan contracts. Similarly, banks benefit from the reduction in the counterparty risk and smooth 
future cash inflows (Diamond, 1991; Petersen and Rajan, 2004; Berger and Udell, 1994; Boot and 
Thakor, 1994; Ongena and Smith, 2001). 
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Contrary to the bilateral lending characterized by the bank-borrower relationship, there are three 
important relationships in syndicated lending: between borrowers and lead arrangers, between borrowers 
and participants and between lead arrangers and participants. To better grasp the information asymmetry 
in the syndication setting, we consider the three principal phases of a syndication transaction. The first is 
the pre-mandate phase, during which the details of the proposed transaction are discussed and finalized 
between the arrangers and the borrower. Because borrowers have an information advantage over lead 
arrangers, there is a potential adverse selection problem. This is more severe when the borrower is 
opaque, e.g., when very little public information is available about the borrower. Lead arrangers can 
reduce adverse selection through screening. A prior lending relationship between lead arrangers and 
borrowers can also reduce the severity of the adverse selection problem. The second phase is the post-
mandate phase, during which the syndication itself takes place and facility agreements are negotiated. At 
this point, an information memorandum is drawn up, and information is ready for dispatch to potential 
participants. Until this time, participants have no information about the loan, and they depend on the 
arranger for due diligence. The information superiority of lead arrangers over participants can lead to an 
adverse selection problem. Because participants are ignorant about the dynamics of the loan and the 
affairs of the borrowers, the lead arrangers can shift bad loans toward participants. This problem is 
potentially more severe when lead arrangers fund only a small part of the loan and less severe for 
reputable arrangers. The third and final phase in the syndication process is the post-signing phase, which 
lasts for the life of the facility itself. After the disbursement of the loan to the borrower, lead arrangers 
generally assume the monitoring and administering responsibilities and bear all costs associated with the 
monitoring and administering. During this third phase, the information advantage of the borrower over all 
lenders leads to a moral hazard problem (Miller and Chew, 2008; Yener and Gadanecz, 2006; Rhodes and 
Dawson, 2004). This moral hazard problem is more severe when the borrower is opaque or when the lead 
arranger has no prior relationship with the borrower. There is, furthermore, a moral hazard problem 
between the lead arranger and the participant if the arranger does not fulfill the monitoring task as 
promised. This problem is potentially more severe when lead arrangers fund only a small part of the loan 
and less severe for reputable arrangers. Because lead arrangers are repeat players in the syndication loan 
market, shirking them would lead to a loss of reputation and future quasi rents (Pichler and Wilhelm, 
2001).  
Various studies have investigated the asymmetric information problems between lead arrangers 
and participants by analyzing the loan’s syndicate structure. These studies differ, however, with respect to 
the factors that their authors believe affect the syndicate structure. One strand of literature confirms that 
informed lead arrangers do not exploit the opacity of the borrowers or take advantage of participants. 
Rather, lead arrangers retain a higher share of the loan and form more concentrated syndicates (Simons, 
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1993; Jones et al., 2005; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004). Lead arranger reputation has also been suggested to 
be consequential in the concentration of the syndicate. Sufi (2007) and Lee and Mullineaux (2004) have 
empirically shown that syndicates grow larger and more diffuse when arrangers are more reputable. In 
contrast, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) discuss opportunistic behavior by lead arrangers and find that 
lead arrangers are more likely to syndicate out loans when the lead arranger has a strong reputation, the 
loan is large and the borrowing firm is public. They argue that, conditional on a loan being syndicated, a 
larger percentage of the loan is syndicated when there is public information available about the borrowing 
firm and the lead arranger has a strong reputation. In addition to these information asymmetry studies, 
Esty and Megginson, (2003), Esty (2004) and Qian and Strahan (2007) evaluate the impact of creditor's 
rights on syndicated loans and find that syndicates are more concentrated when creditor rights are 
stronger. Finally, Gatev and Strahan (2009) discuss the liquidity risk in the syndicated loan market. The 
authors decompose syndicated loan risk into credit, market and liquidity risk and test how these shape 
syndicate structure. They conclude that commercial banks dominate relative to non-banks in loan 
syndicates that expose lenders to liquidity risk and that this dominance is more pronounced when 
borrowers have high levels of credit or market risk.  
Vu and Skully (2008) explore the risk-selling versus informational roles of a lead bank's decision 
to syndicate a loan. They conclude that syndications force lead banks to convey ex-ante private 
information to potential syndicate members, who accept lower loan yields as a result. However, the lead 
banks try to recover their information-selling costs by charging higher commitment fees. Ivashina (2009), 
Focarelli (2008) and Thomas and Wang (2004) discuss loan pricing in the syndicated loan market. 
Ivashina (2009) confirms the risk-selling argument of Vu and Skully (2008) and concludes that the 
observed relationship between syndicate structure and the loan spread is influenced not only by 
information asymmetry but also by diversification consideration. Focarelli (2008) notes that loans in 
which arrangers' retain a higher proportion are judged as less risky; hence, these loans carry lower interest 
rates. Ferreira and Matos (2012) elaborate that banks charge higher interest rate spreads and face less 
credit risk after origination when they have some role in the governance of the firm.  
 Our primary objective in this study is to gain additional insights on the effects of information 
asymmetry on the structure of the loan syndicate. First, we extend the scope of the analysis to include the 
population of lead arrangers. Whereas Sufi (2007), for example, focuses on a limited set of the top 100 
most active and most reputable lead arrangers, our study includes all 1,080 lead arrangers listed in the 
LPC Dealscan database. By analyzing not only top lead arrangers but also those with small market shares, 
we are able to verify whether the benefits of reputation are universal or restricted only to the top lead 
arrangers. Our second contribution lies in the fact that we analyze information asymmetry in more depth. 
In contrast to Sufi’s approach to measuring the borrower reputation and the lead arranger-borrower 
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relationship throughout the history of the syndicated loan market, which is 15 years in his study, we 
hypothesize that 15 years is too long a period to measure reputation and relationship effectively. 
Therefore, we investigate several proxies of the borrower reputation, the lead arranger reputation and the 
relationship between lead arrangers and borrowers by considering how recently the reputation was 
acquired and the length of the relationship between the lead arrangers and the borrower.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. The Sample 
We obtain our sample of syndicated loans from LPC’s Dealscan database, which provides information on 
more than 150,000 syndicated and bilateral loans dating back to 1986. Though lenders do self-report in 
this database, accuracy is maintained through teams of researchers based in New York, London, Hong 
Kong and Tokyo, who are in touch with loan syndication desks on a day-to-day basis. Additionally, they 
monitor newswires, market journals and the Internet, and this information is verified with one or more of 
the mandated banks (Rhodes and Dawson, 2004). The database provides detailed information on the 
syndicate structure, including the number of lead arrangers, the total number of lenders and the 
percentage share held by syndicate members for any particular deal. The database also reports loan-
related variables, including the maturity of the loan, the deal and tranche size, the signing and maturity 
dates and the purpose of the loan. The borrower-related variables include the borrower’s name, country of 
origin, sales, ticker and industry. 
Our sample consists of 17,839 loan deals advanced to 8,701 US firms between January 1986 and 
August 2007.2 Although Dealscan reports loans on the tranche level, we conduct our analysis on the deal 
level. Here, we follow Sufi (2007), who argues that the actual syndicated loan contract is drafted at the 
deal level and that covenants and all lenders are listed together on this contract, even if a specific lender 
loans only on one tranche. Moreover, multiple tranches of the same deal cannot be treated as independent 
observations because such an analysis would produce standard errors that are improperly small. To avoid 
sample bias, we take all loans signed during the above-mentioned period and do not restrict our sample to 
a particular number of lead arrangers or participants. We include deals for which the sales volume of the 
borrowers, the maturity of the loan and the deal amount are available. Furthermore, we include all the 
loans for which the percentage share of syndicate members is available. This demarcation allows us to 
explicitly measure the syndicate structure by, for example, defining the lending share of the lead arrangers 
or the concentration of the syndicate based on the lead arrangers lending shares. Our sample is therefore 
                                                            
2 We end our sample period in August 2007 to exclude the 2007/08 financial crisis. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that the 
crisis had started by the end of the year 2007 and that loan volumes dropped. Thus, credit rationing during the crisis will only 
allow the best borrowers to raise syndicated loans, and the nature and impact of information asymmetry may be very different for 
this specific sub-sample of borrowers. 
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larger than those used in comparable studies and provides a stronger foundation for our conclusions. In 
their syndicate structure analyses, Sufi (2007) uses 4,414 loans to US borrowers, and Dennis and 
Mullineaux (2000) rely on a sample of 3,410 loans.  
 We include bilateral loans in our sample for which the information asymmetry dynamics are 
arguably of a different nature. As there are no participants in the syndicate, only the asymmetric 
information problem between borrower and lead arranger exists. Rather than considering this to be a loan 
type distinctly different from syndicated loans, we consider this as a corner solution to the asymmetric 
information problem. As asymmetric information problems increase, lead arrangers must hold a higher 
and higher lending share to attract participating banks. Ultimately, however, asymmetric information 
problems may become so severe that no other bank is willing to participate and the lead arranger has to 
fund the loan on its own. In this case, there is not much difference between a lead arranger with a 99% 
lending share for any particular loan and a lead arranger with a 100% lending share. Consistent with these 
arguments, Sufi (2007) empirically shows that borrowers with little or no credit reputation obtain 
syndicated loans that are similar to bilateral loans, while more reputable borrowers obtain syndicated 
loans that have more dispersed syndicates and are thus comparable to public debt. As we do not exclude 
borrowers with little or no credit reputation from our sample, we consider it appropriate to include 
bilateral loans. We will, however, exclude bilateral loans in a robustness check. It may be noted that our 
sample contains 5,328 loans with one lead arranger and no participants, 352 loans with multiple lead 
arrangers but no participants, 9,126 loans with one lead arranger and one or more participants and 3,033 
loans with multiple lead arrangers and one or more participants. In the first two groups, the lead 
arranger’s lending share is by definition 100%. In the latter two groups, lending shares range from 
17.15% to 99.99%. Specifically, there are 176 syndicates with lending shares of 95-99% and another 41 
syndicates with lending shares of 90-94%. The existence of loans with high lending shares confirms our 
view that bilateral loans are a corner solution. 
  
4.2. Measuring the Syndicate Structure 
In the Dealscan database, the two fields available from which it is possible to identify the lead arrangers 
are "Lead Arranger" and "All Lenders". We classify lenders listed in the "Lead Arranger" field as lead 
arrangers and all other lenders listed in the "All Lenders" field as participants. If the "Lead Arranger" 
field is missing, any lender listed as having a role of "Lead" in the "All Lenders" field is considered to be 
a lead arranger. While Sufi (2007) restricts his analysis to the top 100 lead arrangers, we consider all lead 
arrangers. Accordingly, we are not limited to the most active and most reputable lead arrangers; rather, 
we can investigate a wider range of lead arrangers, including those with a moderate to low market share, 
e.g., reputation. Furthermore, we aggregate all syndicate members to their parent company and assume 
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that the information about the borrowers and the participants is shared between subsidiaries and parent 
companies. Moreover, we assume an exchange of information when there is a merger or an acquisition 
because acquiring banks inherit both previous lead arranger-participant relationships and previous 
borrowing firm relationships of the acquired bank. Consistent with Sufi (2007), we use the average 
percentage share held by all lead arrangers as a proxy for syndicate structure. Dennis and Mullineaux 
(2000) use a similar proxy but focus on the percentage share held by the participants.  
 
4.3. Determinants of the Syndicate Structure 
4.3.1. Borrower Opaqueness 
The opaqueness of the borrower determines the degree of information asymmetry between the borrower 
and the lender before screening, monitoring, prior relationships or other information asymmetry-reducing 
actions take effect. The banking literature often uses accounting ratios, such as market value of assets to 
the book value of assets or the ratio of gross total assets to gross physical assets of the borrower, as a 
measure of opacity (Strahan, 1999; Piatti and Dell'Ariccia, 2004). In contrast, we follow Dennis and 
Mullineaux (2000) and Sufi (2007) to determine opacity and employ dummy variables for different types 
of opacity. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) argue that information is more likely to be transparent when 
the borrower has a credit rating, is a listed firm or is large (as reflected in annual sales). Based on the 
information about the borrower’s rating and ticker given in the Dealscan database, we classify borrowers 
into three categories based on their opacity. The first type of borrower is a private firm without S&P 
senior debt rating or ticker. As very little public information is available for such borrowers, we 
categorize these borrowers as “highly opaque”, indicating borrowers who are the least transparent, e.g., 
they have the greatest information asymmetry. The second type of borrower is only “semi-opaque”, as it 
has either an S&P senior debt rating or a ticker but not both. These borrowers are more transparent 
compared to the private borrowers due to the availability of a rating or of traded securities and the 
associated disclosure requirements. The third type of borrower is the least opaque and is categorized as 
"transparent". This type of borrower has both an S&P senior debt rating and a ticker and, as such, 
discloses a great amount of information to the market. 
 
4.3.2. Borrower Reputation in the Syndicated Loan Market 
While a borrower may be opaque, if the borrower accessed the loan market in the past, he is already 
known among banks and information asymmetry may therefore be reduced. Thus the borrower is 
considered to be reputable. According to Sufi (2007), a reputable borrower is one who accessed the 
syndicated loan market prior to the loan in question. Thus, Sufi implicitly assumes that a borrower can 
build reputation by borrowing once and that this reputation remains unchanged over time. In contrast, we 
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postulate that borrower reputation changes over time. The more recently a borrower entered the market, 
the higher the borrower’s reputation, i.e., the lower its information asymmetry. We therefore differentiate 
between the number of prior loans a borrower raised during the previous five years, three years and one 
year. Sufi (2007) finds that reputable but opaque borrowers have less concentrated syndicates, indicating 
that borrower reputation can overcome information asymmetry problems. With our more detailed proxies, 
we are the first to indicate how stable this reputation effect is over time. We measure these three proxies 
as the natural log of 1 plus the number of prior loans during the five years (PB#,5), three years (PB#,3) or 
one year (PB#,3) prior to the signing of the current loan. Additionally, we define dummy variables for 
different time periods prior to loan signing (PBD,t) and code them as 1 if the borrower has raised at least 
one prior loan during the respective period and 0 otherwise. With respect to time periods, we consider the 
prior one year (PBD,1), three years (PBD,3) and five years (PBD,5). We also split the total five-year period 
prior to loan signing into three non-overlapping sub-periods consisting of year one for the first sub-period 
(PBD,1), years two and three for second sub-period (PBD,2+3 only) and years four and five for third sub-
period (PBD,4+5 only). Our main proxy is PB#,5 and we will use the other proxies for in-depth analyses. 
 
4.3.3 Arranger Reputation 
To measure lead arranger reputation, we follow Sufi (2007) and use the market share of the lead arranger 
based on his actual lending share in the loans arranged in the year prior to the loan in question. Lead 
arranger reputation is valuable and can thus be used as a commitment device for participants. Reputable 
lead arrangers can lower their lending share when participants believe that the fear of reputation loss will 
keep the lead arrangers committed to monitoring. While Sufi (2007) only considers the top 100 lead 
arrangers in terms of market share, we provide a broader and more detailed analysis as we consider all 
1,080 different lead arrangers listed in the Dealscan database for our sample of 17,839 loans. In addition 
to measuring their exact market share, we also distinguish high- from low-reputation lead arrangers. First, 
we divide all lead arrangers into the bottom, middle and top 33% groups based on the lead arranger’s 
prior year market share. These categories are of equal size, with 360 lead arrangers in each. The 360 lead 
arrangers in the top percentile group are considered to be of high reputation. As such, the allocation of a 
specific lead arranger to one of the three categories can change from year to year. While the categories 
consist of the same number of lead arrangers, the number of loans associated with a top-reputation lead 
arranger is higher than the number of loans associated with a mid- or low-reputation lead arranger 
because our proxy is based on market shares and, thus, indirectly on loan numbers. We also consider the 
top 100 and top 20 most reputable lead arrangers as an even more restrictive selection. By focusing on the 
top 100 lead arrangers, we can compare our results more directly to Sufi’s (2007), while the top 20 lead 
arrangers are truly those with the highest reputation, as evidenced in Table A-II of the appendix. 
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4.3.4 Borrower-Lead Arranger Relationship 
When measuring the borrower-lead arranger relationship, Sufi (2007) uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the current lead arranger has also served previously as lead arranger for the borrower. As Sufi (2007) 
explains, this proxy allows the distinction between the adverse selection aspect and the moral hazard 
aspect of information asymmetry between lead arranger and participants. On the one hand, if lead 
arrangers have private information from prior interactions with the borrower, they may be tempted to 
syndicate out more of the loan if the private information is negative. To prevent this adverse selection 
problem, participants require a higher lending share from these lead arrangers. On the other hand, if lead 
arrangers have private information from prior interactions with the borrower, then lead arrangers have 
already made an effort to acquire information and there is less need to commit to monitoring. Thus, the 
moral hazard problem between lead arrangers and participants is reduced, and the lead arranger can hold a 
smaller share in the loan.  
Similar to our approach to borrower reputation, we revise this proxy by taking the time horizon of 
the relationship into account. Our main proxy for the relationship between the borrower and the lead 
arranger (FLD,5) is based on the five-year time horizon prior to loan signing, and it is coded as 1 if the 
current lead arranger has been the lead arranger for the borrower during the past five years and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, we consider the three-year time horizon (FLD,3) and the one-year time horizon 
(FLD,1). We also split the total five-year period prior to loan signing into three non-overlapping sub-
periods consisting of year one for the first sub-period (FLD,1), years two and three for the second sub-
period (FLD,2+3 only) and years four and five for the third sub-period (FLD,4+5 only). Our main proxy is FLD,5 
and we will use the other proxies for in-depth analyses. 
 
4.3.5. Other Determinants of the Syndicate Structure 
We use a number of additional control variables that have been shown to determine syndicate structure. 
We use the sales of the borrower (borrower size) and deal size of the loan (loan size) as proxies for the 
size of the firm and the loan, respectively. Consistent with Sufi (2007), we also divide the deal size of the 
loan into three size groups based on the bottom, mid and top 33% of the distribution and define dummies 
for medium-sized (mid) and large loans (large) to capture the effects of loan size. Because longer-term 
loans have different dynamics compared to shorter ones, we include loan maturity as a control. From the 
lender's perspective, term loans entail less liquidity problems because they are drawn down immediately 
at the beginning of the loan; thus, we include term loan dummies in our analysis. To capture the impact of 
multiple-tranche deals, we use dummies for loans that belong to multiple-tranche deals. We also include 
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dummies for the year of loan signing and the industry of the borrower to capture their effects in our 
regressions. The exact definitions of the variables are listed in Table A-I of the appendix. 
 
4.4. Methodology 
We use regression analysis to investigate the relationship between syndicate structure and its potential 
determinants. We follow Esty and Megginson (2003), Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Ferreira and Matos 
(2012) and estimate a tobit model as our dependent variable, the lending share percentage of the lead 
arrangers, is censored at both ends at 0% and 100%.3 Greene (2008) argues that it is not appropriate to use 
a tobit regression if the data are always censored. However, it is appropriate to use a tobit model for a 
sample of observations (which may or may not be censored) that is randomly drawn from the population.  
For all regressions, we report standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the 
borrower level. 
  
5. Results  
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table I provides an overview of the borrower, the loan and the syndicate structure characteristics of our 
sample. To better understand the dynamics of the syndicate structure and the loan characteristics in terms 
of information asymmetry, we classify firms into three categories based on their opaqueness. In our 
sample, 28% of all loans are incurred by highly opaque borrowers, 42% are incurred by semi-opaque 
borrowers and 30% are incurred by transparent borrowers.4 Panel A of Table I reports the loan and 
borrower characteristics. Transparent borrowers tend to be large firms with on average of $4,680 million 
in sales. On average, transparent borrowers are approximately seven times larger than the semi-opaque 
borrowers and nine times larger than the highly opaque borrowers. Not surprisingly, transparent 
borrowers receive, on average, larger loans ($621 million) than semi-opaque ($130 million) and highly 
opaque ($101 million) borrowers and have borrowed more frequently in the past. As such, highly opaque 
borrowers suffer doubly from asymmetric information. Being opaque, they have no traded securities, no 
requirement to publish annual reports or other financial information and no benefit from certification by 
                                                            
3  We also estimate OLS regression model and find very similar results except the interaction of lead arranger 
reputation with the opaque borrowers that we find it statistically insignificant. As this interaction term is significant 
in our non-linear tobit model, which itself is an indication of a non-linear relationship between lead arranger 
reputation and the share held by the lead arrangers in case of informationally opaque borrowers. 
4  Our categories of “highly opaque” and “semi-opaque” firms generally correspond to Sufi’s (2007) private and 
unrated firms, respectively. The sample proportions are slightly different from Sufi (2007), whose sample includes 
relatively more transparent firms – a difference most likely driven by the fact that he focuses only on the top 100 
lead arrangers. This seems plausible because lead arrangers with a high market share can, to some extent, select their 
borrowers and, thus, lend to the best, most transparent firms; as Gatti et al. (2012) show, firms also benefit by 
borrowing from prestigious lead arrangers. The higher average market share of lead arrangers who lend to 
transparent borrowers documented in Table I also supports this interpretation. 
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credit rating agencies. In addition, they have almost no history in the loan market and no bank with 
private information about them. Finally, term loans are more common among highly opaque borrowers, 
thereby giving liquidity relief to syndicate members. The remaining loan and firm characteristics do not 
differ substantially across the three firm types. Most of the borrowers belong to the manufacturing 
industry and raise funds for general corporate purposes and debt repayment. 
 
[Insert Table I about here] 
 
Panel B of Table I describes the syndicate structure for our three types of borrowers. On average, 
there are nine lenders in a loan syndicate for a transparent borrower compared to only three for a highly or 
semi-opaque borrower. While this difference is substantial, the average number of lead arrangers is close 
to one and similar for all types of borrowers. Thus, syndicates differ mainly in the number of participants. 
Furthermore, the fact that the median number of lenders equals one for highly and semi-opaque borrowers 
indicates that the bilateral loans included in our sample are most dominant in these two borrower groups. 
This substantial difference in the syndicate size provides strong initial support for our hypothesis that lead 
arrangers form concentrated syndicates when the borrower is opaque and that they syndicate out more 
when the borrower is transparent. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the average lending share of 
the lead arranger, which is substantially higher for highly opaque (69.35%) and semi-opaque (65.71%) 
borrowers than for transparent ones (27.67%). The average market share of the lead arrangers in the year 
prior to loan signing is 0.54% for private borrowers, 0.67% for unrated borrowers and 1.18% for 
transparent borrowers.5 Thus, transparent borrowers seem able to attract more prestigious lead arrangers. 
This conclusion is also supported by the relatively high number of loans to transparent borrowers 
arranged by high-reputation lead arrangers. When we split the lead arrangers into three categories, that is, 
top-, mid- and low-reputation lead arrangers, we find that top-reputation lead arrangers arrange 71% of all 
loans to transparent borrowers but only 53% of all loans to very- and semi-opaque borrowers. While Ross 
(2010) shows that the most reputable banks, e.g., those with the highest market shares, are known for their 
superior screening and monitoring abilities, our sample seems to suggests that the most reputable lead 
arrangers do not predominantly use their superior abilities for the most difficult, e.g. opaque, borrowers. 
Furthermore, top-reputation lead arrangers arrange more loans but fund less of each loan compared to less 
reputable lead arrangers. This holds across all borrower types. However, lead arrangers’ lending shares 
                                                            
5 These figures represent the average market share across all lead arrangers in the syndicate. As Table A-II in the appendix 
shows, the syndicated loan market is highly concentrated with the top 20 lead arrangers accounting for 72% of the total volume 
of syndicated loans. Nevertheless, our sample includes 1,080 lead arrangers active in the syndicated loan market. Thus, for the 
average syndicated loan, the lead arranger reputation is rather low. The most reputable lead arrangers only affect the tail of 
distribution. At the 90, 95 and 99 percentile, the average market share across all lead arrangers in the syndicate is 2.4%, 4.0% and 
9.1%, respectively. 
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are generally lower for loans to transparent than for loans to opaque borrowers. This could be driven by 
the reduced information asymmetry problem of transparent borrowers and by loan size, as transparent 
borrowers are larger firms with larger loans. When splitting borrowers into three size categories, we find 
that, for each borrower type, the lead arranger’s lending share drops as borrower size increases. To ensure 
that our regression results are not driven by borrower size or loan size, we include both proxies in our 
regressions and – following Sufi (2007) – divide the loans into small, medium and large loans based on 
their deal size. 
 
5.2. Main Effects of Information Asymmetry 
Table II presents our basic regressions regarding the effects of information asymmetry on syndicate 
structure. The design of this table is closely related to Sufi (2007), but we use our modified proxies for 
previous borrower, lead arranger reputation and former lead. Our dependent variable is the average 
percentage share held by the lead arranger. In regression 1, the positive and significant coefficients for 
highly and semi-opaque borrowers confirm our main hypothesis that the more the borrower needs 
monitoring and due diligence, the more concentrated the syndicate is. By holding a higher lending share, 
lead arrangers signal their monitoring commitment to participants. In contrast, as the information 
asymmetry vis-à-vis the borrower decreases, lead arrangers make less of an effort to monitor the 
borrower, and consequently, the signal to participants can be weaker. In other words, the lead arranger 
can fund less of the loan. Furthermore, comparing both types of opaque firms shows that lead arrangers 
form more concentrated syndicates for highly opaque borrowers compared to semi-opaque borrowers. 
The coefficient for semi-opaque borrowers is smaller in absolute size than those for highly opaque 
borrowers, thus indicating that the former are more transparent. For the remainder of our analysis and 
consistent with Sufi (2007), we combine both types of borrowers as both show similar results in Table II, 
and we consider them to be opaque. Regression 2 of Table II confirms the findings of regression 1 and 
shows that when the borrower is opaque, lead arrangers retain a higher percentage share of the loan and 
syndicates are more concentrated.  
Consistent with the literature, the negative and significant coefficient for our previous borrower 
proxy in regression 3 confirms that the reputation of the borrower reduces the problems of information 
asymmetry in the syndicated loan market. When we add an interaction term of opaqueness and borrower 
reputation in regression 4, this interaction term is statistically significant, but the direct effect of borrower 
reputation disappears. Thus, while lead arrangers have to signal their commitment to monitoring for 
opaque borrowers by holding larger lending shares, they need to make less of a commitment via lower 
lending shares for reputable opaque borrowers. Accordingly, borrower reputation reduces the information 
asymmetry problem only for opaque but not for transparent borrowers. 
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With respect to borrower reputation, lead arranger reputation can also reduce the problem of 
information asymmetry. The coefficient of lead arranger reputation is negative and significant in 
regression 5, thus indicating that more reputable lead arrangers can reduce their lending shares. However, 
the interaction term of opaqueness and lead arranger reputation in regression 6 shows that the reduction in 
lending share is stronger for opaque borrowers. This, in turn, indicates that lead arranger reputation is 
more valuable for these borrowers. Overall, we conclude that lead arrangers can use their reputation to 
signal their reduced moral hazard problem to the participating banks. As reputable lead arrangers fear a 
loss of reputation and drop in future business, they face less of a moral hazard problem and, therefore, 
have less need to signal their monitoring commitment with their lending share. 
The past relationship between the lead arranger and the borrower allows us to distinguish between 
the adverse selection and moral hazard aspect of information asymmetry. If private information from 
prior interactions with the borrower leads to an adverse selection problem, then participants require a 
higher lending share from these lead arrangers, and we should find a positive coefficient for our former 
lead proxy. In contrast, due to private information from prior interactions with the borrower, the moral 
hazard problem between lead arrangers and participants is reduced, the lead arranger can hold a smaller 
share in the loan, and we should find a negative coefficient for our former lead proxy. Regressions 7 and 
8 of Table II show the results. In support of the moral hazard aspect of information asymmetry, we find 
that lead arrangers hold less when they have a previous relationship with the borrower. This indicates that 
the lead arrangers have exerted efforts to monitor the borrower from prior multiple interactions, which 
provides comfort to the participants, who do not require that the lead arrangers hold more. However, as 
observed in regression 8, the interaction term of opaque borrowers with the former lead proxy supports 
the adverse selection aspect of information asymmetry and shows that participants require the former lead 
arrangers to commit to monitoring by holding more when the borrowers are opaque. In particular, our 
evidence for the existence of both moral hazard and adverse selection stands in contrast to Sufi (2007), 
who only finds evidence for moral hazard. In contrast to Sufi (2007), our sample includes not only the 
100 most reputable lead arrangers but all 1,080 lead arrangers, including many low-reputation lead 
arrangers. This sample difference can very well be the driver for the differences in results if low-
reputation lead arrangers are particularly susceptible to adverse selection because they have little 
reputation to lose. We will investigate this issue in more detail in section 5 with a specific focus on the 
role of different levels of lead arranger reputation. 
 The coefficients of our control variables are generally consistent with the literature and are stable 
across regressions 1 to 8. From Table I, we note that borrower size, deal size and maturity are higher for 
transparent firms. As Table II shows, these three control variables have a significant impact on the 
syndicate structure by themselves, as the percentage held by lead arrangers decreases with the size of the 
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firm, the size of the loan and the maturity of the loan. Nevertheless, our proxies for borrower transparency 
are still significant. In particular, our results for term loans are consistent with Gatev and Strahan (2009). 
Term loans create a less significant liquidity problem for lenders because they are disbursed at the 
beginning of the loan term and lenders face no uncertainty regarding their liquidity position. Due to this 
lower liquidity risk in the term loans, the lead arrangers are willing to hold more.  
 
[Insert Table II about here] 
 
5.3. Borrower Reputation 
In Table III, we investigate the impact of borrower reputation on the information asymmetry and, hence, 
the loan retention by lead arrangers in more depth. We employ not only our main proxy based on the 
number of prior loans within the past five years (PB#,5) but also our additional proxies for the past three 
years (PB#,3) and one year (PB#,1). For ease of comparison, regression 3 replicates regression 8 of Table II. 
Our results show that the reputation of the opaque borrower reduces the problem of information 
asymmetry but that these effects are stronger for reputation build-up over the longer periods of three and 
five years. Reputation that is built up in just the prior year is inconsequential. Therefore, the results 
documented in Table III appear to be driven by borrowers who repeatedly access the syndicated loan 
market and are thereby exposing themselves to constant screening and monitoring by lead arrangers. As 
Table A-II of the appendix shows, the number of prior loans increases with the time horizon. For 
borrowers with prior loans, the average number of prior loans rises from 1.55 for the prior one year to 
2.05 for the prior three years and to 2.44 for the prior five years. While it is not surprising that reputation 
is only valuable if built up over time, the documented effects reflect both the time horizon and the number 
of prior loans. To focus on the time horizon aspect of reputation independent of the number of loans, we 
consider alternative reputation proxies that measure the access to the syndicated loan market as dummies. 
We first consider dummies that reflect whether a borrower had at least one loan in the past one year 
(PBD,1), three years (PBD,3) or five years (PBD,5). Regressions 1 to 3 in Table IV show that all three 
borrower reputation measures have an economically similar effect. However, the three proxies are not 
mutually exclusive because, for example, the number of loans in the prior year of loan signing is included 
in all three proxies. Therefore, in regression 4, we distinguish between borrowers who have at least one 
loan in the year before loan signing (PBD,1), borrowers who have at least one loan in the 2nd or 3rd year 
before loan signing but no loans in the year immediately prior to loan signing (PBD,2+3 only) and borrowers 
who have at least one loan in the 4th or 5th year before loan signing but no loans in the first 3 years prior to 
loan signing (PBD,4+5 only). Regression 4 reveals that only PBD,1 has the strongest negative and significant 
coefficient. In combination, Table IV reveals that reputation effects are relatively short lived, i.e., limited 
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to the year prior to loan signing, while Table III shows that the reputation effect is only more persistent 
for those few borrowers who repeatedly enter the syndicated loan market over time. Overall, we conclude 
that reputation of the opaque borrower reduces the problems of information asymmetry. However, 
borrower reputation is not permanent; rather, it is temporal and diminishes over time. This seems 
plausible, considering rapid changes in the industry and the financial health of the borrower, on the one 
hand, and changes in the economic conditions, on the other hand. Borrowers can build up a valuable 
reputation by either borrowing repeatedly over time and, thus, being exposed to continuous monitoring or, 
if borrowing only infrequently, being exposed to recent monitoring that reveals the most current 
information about the borrower. 
 
[Insert Tables III and IV about here] 
 
5.4. Lead Arranger Reputation 
Next, we analyze lead arranger reputation in more detail. In particular, we consider highly reputable lead 
arrangers and create three dummy variables that indicate whether a lead arranger belongs to a high-
reputation group. First, we consider the top 33% of lead arrangers based on their market share in the 
syndicated loan market in the year prior to loan signing (LRhigh,D). Second and consistent with Sufi 
(2007), we consider only the 100 most reputable lead arrangers (LR100,D). Third, given the highly 
concentrated nature of the syndicated loan market shown in Table A-II of the appendix, we also consider 
the 20 most reputable lead arrangers (LR20,D). Only the most reputable lead arrangers – either the top 20, 
top 100 or top 33% – can claim substantial market shares, and it is therefore possible that they are driving 
the results documented in Table II for lead arranger reputation and the arranger-borrower relationship. 
Table V shows the results when we include a proxy and interaction terms for the most-reputable 
lead arrangers. For each comparison, regression 1 replicates our benchmark results, e.g., regression 8 of 
Table II. Interestingly, we find that only the most reputable lead arrangers can credibly use their 
reputation as a commitment device. While the coefficient of the high-reputation lead arranger dummy is 
insignificant in regression 2, the coefficient of the top 100 and top 20 lead arranger dummies in 
regressions 3 and 4 are negative and significant, while the lead arranger reputation proxy (LR) becomes 
(almost) insignificant. Thus, we conclude that Sufi’s (2007) results are driven by his sample of top 100 
lead arrangers and that his findings cannot be generalized. Similarly, while our baseline results of lead 
arranger reputation in Table II are substantially driven by the most reputable lead arrangers, the results 
have a strong enough reputation to credibly signal their monitoring commitment to the participating 
banks. 
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Regarding the arranger-borrower relationship, it appears that the effects of the arranger-borrower 
relationship on the lead arranger’s lending share also depend on the reputation of the lead arrangers. We 
now add interaction effects for the effect that the former lead status of a highly reputable arranger has for 
an opaque borrower such that we have FL*opaque*LRhigh,D in regression 2, FL*opaque*LRhigh,D in 
regression 3 and FL*opaque*LR20,D in regression 4. This interaction effect has a negative and significant 
impact on the arranger’s lending share only in regressions 3 and 4, and the impact is more substantial for 
the top 20 arrangers. Overall, we interpret the findings for the arranger-borrower relationship as follows. 
There is evidence for moral hazard aspects of the information asymmetry problem for all borrowers, both 
transparent and opaque, and all lead arrangers, independent of their reputation. In contrast, the adverse 
selection problem is associated only with opaque borrowers. However, the most reputable former lead 
arrangers can counteract the adverse selection effect. Accordingly, our results are consistent with Sufi 
(2007), who finds a positive but insignificant adverse selection effect for loans to opaque borrowers 
arranged by the 100 most reputable lead arrangers.6 In general, participants require all former lead 
arrangers to hold a higher lending share for opaque borrowers where lead arrangers may be most likely 
tempted to syndicate out ‘lemons’. The most reputable lead arrangers – but only the top 20 and, to a lesser 
extent, the top 100 lead arrangers – can counteract this increase in lending share. 
 
[Insert Table V about here] 
 
5.5. Borrower-Lead Arranger Relationship 
In Table VI, we further disaggregate our basic borrower-lead arranger results of regression 8 in Table II 
with specific attention to the timeliness of the former lead’s interaction with the borrower. Similar to our 
proxies for the previous borrower, we distinguish two situations. First, we consider borrowers who have 
at least one loan with the same lead arranger in the one year prior to loan signing (FLD,1), three years prior 
to loan signing (FLD,3) or five years prior to loan signing (FLD,5). Second, we more specifically distinguish 
borrowers who have at least one loan with the same lead arranger in the 2nd or 3rd year before loan signing 
but no such loans in the year immediately prior to loan signing (FLD,2+3 only) and borrowers who have at 
least one loan with the same lead arranger in the 4th or 5th year before loan signing but no such loans in the 
first 3 years prior to loan signing (FLD,4+5 only). Regressions 1 to 3 show similar effects across the different 
time horizons. The coefficients are negative for the former lead proxy and positive for the interaction term 
– just as in our baseline specification – but no clear patterns can be observed over time. However, as 
                                                            
6 Regarding regression 3, an F-test on whether the sum of both coefficients of FL*opaque and FL*opaque*LRhigh,D is different 
from zero results in a value of 0.60, which is insignificant. Similarly, the corresponding F-test for regression 4 results in a value 
of 0.51, which is insignificant. This indicates that there is no statistically significant adverse selection effect for the most 
reputable lead arrangers. 
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Table A-III in the appendix shows, for borrowers who do have a former lead arranger, the average 
number of prior loans with the same former lead arranger increases over time from 1.52 in the prior one 
year to 1.95 in the prior three years and, finally, to 2.25 in the prior five years. If borrowers repeatedly 
interact with the same lead arranger, our simple proxies are not mutually exclusive. The more specific 
proxies used in regression 4 are mutually exclusive and do reveal a time pattern such that the one-year 
effects reflected by FLD,1 hardly differ from the two- and three-year effect reflected by FLD,2+3 only – a 
finding that can be explained by the fact that, on average, the maturity of our loans is just under 3.5 years. 
Thus, when the current loan is signed, the lead arranger is still actively monitoring a prior loan, even if 
this prior loan was signed three years ago. However, with an average maturity of less than four years, 
many of the loans signed even earlier are no longer outstanding, and the lead arranger is not necessarily 
monitoring the borrower. Thus, the effect diminishes for FLD,4+5 only. 
 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
 
6. Robustness Checks  
To check whether our main results – regression 8 of Table II and regression 4 of Table V – are robust to 
different specifications and data samples, we perform a number of tests in Table VII. For ease of 
comparison, we replicate our benchmark regressions as regressions 1 and 2. Our first set of robustness 
checks focuses on different samples. We then begin to investigate whether the inclusion of sole lenders 
affects our results. Despite the fact that there is no involvement of funds from participants, we view these 
bilateral loans as a corner solution to the information asymmetry problem in syndicated lending. To assess 
the influence of this assumption, we exclude bilateral loans from our sample. As regressions 3 and 4 
reveal, our results are robust to this exclusion. We can, therefore, satisfactorily conclude that there is no 
difference between sole lenders and other lenders as far as the syndicate structure relationship is 
concerned.  
Next, we consider specific types of loans in regressions 5 and 6. As described in the introduction, 
among the three different types of syndications, club deals were usually small deals, and the borrower 
generally selects the syndicate members. Hence, as these types of deals involve lenders selected by the 
borrower, they lack typical information asymmetry problems associated with a typical syndicated loan 
structure. However, though only 27 deals in our sample are club deals, we nevertheless exclude them. 
Additionally, we exclude project finance deals due to their different characteristics. As noted by Esty and 
Megginson (2003) and Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), project finance loans differ from syndicated 
loans in terms of syndicate structure and loan pricing. Project finance loans are repaid by the cash flow of 
the project itself, and project finance companies are often highly leveraged. Considering the different 
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features of project finance loans, we exclude the 116 project finance loans from our sample. Furthermore, 
we exclude 1,180 loans to financial firms from our sample. The three categories overlap and we overall 
exclude 1,206 observations. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these deals, as can be evidenced in 
regressions 5 and 6. Our results, therefore, suggest that club deals, project finance deals and loans to 
financial firms do not unduly influence our main results. 
In regressions 7 and 8, we restrict our sample to loans signed between 1992 and 2007. As the 
Dealscan database goes back only to 1986, our proxies for previous borrower, former lead and arranger-
borrower relationships may be understated for loans signed before 1992. The results indicate that this is 
indeed the case. With the exception of our previous borrower (PB) proxy, which now is insignificant 
compared to a 10% significance in our benchmark regressions, all proxies are more significant in 
regressions 7 and 8.  
Finally, rather than using loan deals as the unit of observation in our analysis, we replicate the 
analysis on a tranche level. This increases our sample size to 23,588 observations. Regressions 9 and 10 
confirm our benchmark results, and the reported effects for lead arranger reputation are both statistically 
and economically stronger. Hence, our results are strongly robust on the tranche level. 
 
[Insert Table VII about here] 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper studies the influence of information asymmetry on the structure of lending syndicates. We 
extend the existing literature and gain additional insights by using a range of different and specific proxies 
for borrower reputation, lead arranger reputation and the length of the relationship between lead arrangers 
and borrowers. We show that only the most reputable lead arrangers are able to use their reputation as a 
credible commitment device for participating banks, thereby reducing the moral hazard problem resulting 
from asymmetric information between themselves and the participating banks. Furthermore, we show 
stronger effects of information asymmetry mitigation for borrowers whose reputations are established 
relatively recently or more persistently. We support the moral hazard aspect of information asymmetry for 
borrowers, in general, and document an adverse selection effect only for opaque borrowers. This adverse 
selection effect is stronger for short- to medium-term relationships between borrowers and lead arrangers, 
and only the most reputable former lead arrangers can counteract it. In this sense, the most reputable lead 
arrangers are different.  
Overall, our results show that information asymmetry has a substantial impact on the structure of 
loan syndicates. In particular, both the degree of information asymmetry by itself and its timing are 
important in determining the type of financial contract signed between the bank and the borrower. 
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Reputation – of both the borrower and the lead arranger – is crucial in overcoming these information 
asymmetry problems. Our findings imply that reputation eases access to finance as participating banks are 
more willing to lend. This should be particularly valuable for financially constraint firms or during times 
of credit rationing. 
Our finding that only the most reputable lead arrangers can overcome the adverse selection 
problem that arises from their former lead activities with opaque borrowers has important implications for 
participating banks and policy makers. Participating banks need to correctly read the lead arranger’s 
behavior and appropriately manage their risk exposure in syndicated lending. Policy makers have to 
realize that the contribution of lead arrangers to the overall systemic risk depends on the lead arranger’s 
reputation. A uniform policy to mitigate such risk may thus have asymmetric effects and a policy to limit 
opportunistic behavior of the average, low-reputation lead arrangers may not be effective. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
[Insert Tables A-I to A-III here] 
 
  
23 
 
References 
Ang, J. B. (2008), A survey of recent developments on the literature of finance and growth, Journal of 
Economic Survey, 45 (3), 536-576. 
Bank for International Settlement. (2003), Credit risk transfer (Bank for International Settlement, Ed.). 
Auteur. 
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. (1994), Did risk-based capital allocate bank credit and caused a 'credit crunch' 
in the United States? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26, 585-628. 
Berger, K., & Udell, G. (2001), The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 25, 2127-2167. 
Boot, A. (2000), Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9, 7-15. 
Boot, A., & Thakor, A. (1994), Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market 
game, International Economic Review, 35, 899-920. 
Chui, M., Domanski, D., Kugler, P., & Shek, J. (2010), The collapse of international bank finance during 
the crisis: evidence from syndicated loan markets, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2010.   
Dennis, S. A., & Mullineaux, D. J. (2000), Syndicated loans, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9, 404-
426. 
Dermirguc-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1996), Stock markets, corporate finance and economic growth: A 
survey, The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 223-239. 
Diamond, W. D. (1991), Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed 
debt, Journal of Political Economy, 99, 4. 
Esty, B. (2004), When do foreign banks finance domestic projects? New evidence on the importance of 
legal and financial systems, Harvard Business School, mimeo. 
Esty, B., & Megginson, W. L. (2003), Creditor rights, enforcement and debt ownership structure: 
Evidence from the global syndicated loan market, Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 
38(1), 37-59. 
Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2012), Universal banks and corporate control: Evidence from the global 
syndicated loan market, Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming. 
Focarelli, L. P. A., & Casolaro, D. (2008), The pricing effect of certification on syndicated loans, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 55, 335-349. 
Gadanecz, B. (2004), The syndicated loan market: structure, development and implications. BIS 
Quarterly Review, December 2004. 
Gadanecz, B., Kara, A., & Molyneux, P. (2010), The effect of information asymmetries among lenders on 
syndicated loan spreads, working paper. 
 
24 
 
Gatti, S., Kleimeier, S., Megginson, W. L., & Steffanoni, A. (2012), Arranger Certification in Project 
Finance, Financial Management, forthcoming. 
Gatev, E., & Strahan, P. E. (2009), Liquidity risk and syndicate structure, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 93, 490-504. 
Greene, W.H. (2008), Econometric Analysis, (Pearson Prentice Hall), Pearson Education, Inc.   
Ivashina, V. (2009), Asymmetric informational effects on loan spreads, Journal of Financial Economics, 
92, 300-319. 
Ivashina, V., & Scharfstein, D. (2010), Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008. Journal of 
Financial Economics 97(3), 319-338. 
Jones, J., Lang, W., & Nigro, P. (2005), Agent bank behavior in bank loan syndications, Journal of 
Financial Research, XXVIII, No. 3, 385-402. 
Kleimeier, S., & Megginson, W. L. (2000), Are project finance loans different from other syndicated 
credits? Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 13(1), 75-87. 
Lee, S. W., & Mullineaux, D. J. (2004), Monitoring, financial distress and the structure of commercial 
lending syndicates, Financial Management, Autumn 2004, 107-130. 
Levine, R. (1997), Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35(2), 688-726. 
Macho-Stadler, I., & Perez-Castrillo, J. D. (2001), An introduction to the economics of information, 
Oxford University Press. 
Miller, S., & Chew, W. (2008), A guide to the loan market (Standard & Poor's, Ed.), The McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc. 
Ongena, S., & Smith, D. C. (2001), The duration of bank relationship, Journal of Financial Economics, 
61, 449-475. 
Panyagometh, K., & Roberts, G. (2010), Do lead banks exploit syndicate participants? Evidence from ex 
post risk, Financial Management, 39, 273-299. 
Petersen, M., & Rajan, R. (1994), The benefits of lending relationships: evidence from small business 
data, Journal of Finance, 49(1), 3-37. 
Piatti, E. B. di, & Dell'Ariccia, G. (2004), Bank competition and firm creation, Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 36(2), 225-252. 
Pichler, P., & Wilhelm, W. (2001), A theory of the syndicate: Form follows function, Journal of Finance, 
56(6), 2237-2264. 
Qian, J., & Strahan, P. (2007), How laws and institutions shape financial contracts: The case of bank 
loans, Journal of Finance, LXII(6), 2803-2834. 
25 
 
Berger, A., Miller, N., Petersen, M., Rajan, R. & Stein, J. (2005), Does function follow organizational 
form? Evidence from the lending practice of large and small banks, Journal of Financial 
Economics,  76(2), 237-269. 
Rhodes, M. C., & Dawson, C. (2004), Syndicated lending: practice and documentation, Euromoney 
Books. 
Ross, D. G. (2010), The "dominant bank effect": How high lender reputation affects the information 
content and terms of bank loans, Review of Financial Studies, 23(7), 2730-2756. 
Simons, K. (1993), Why do banks syndicate loans? New England Economic Review of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, 45-52. 
Strahan, P. E. (October 1999), Borrower risk and the price and non-price terms of bank loans, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York No. 90. 
Sufi, A. (2007). Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans, 
Journal of Finance, LXII(2), 629-668. 
Trust, D., & Corporation, C. (2008), Transforming the syndicated loan market, a white paper to the 
industry, Auteur. 
Vu, T., & Skully, M. (2008), Why do banks syndicate loans? New empirical evidence, working paper. 
Yener, A., & Gadanecz, B. (2006), Syndicated loans: a hybrid of relationship lending and publicly traded 
debt, Palgrave Macmillan. 
26 
 
 
 
  
 Fraction 
of loans 
(%) Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Fraction 
of loans 
(%) Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Fraction 
of loans 
(%) Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Loan characteristics
  Deal size ($ million) 101.00 25.00 257.00 130.00 30.30 483.00 621.00 275.00 1,330.00
  Maturity (days) 1,191.05 1,080.00 907.00 1,273.95 1,080.00 8,429.00 1,275.72 1,140.00 792.80
  Multiple tranche deal 26.68 24.02 25.26
  Deal containing term loan 20.76 16.30 7.08
Borrower characteristics
  Total sales ($ million) 526.00 93.90 3,770.00 635.00 140.00 3,970.00 4,680.00 1,400.00 13,800.00
  Number of previous syndicated loans 0.66 0.00 1.45 1.20 0.00 2.10 2.57 1.00 3.39
Purpose of the loan
  Acquisition line 4.18        4.66        3.50        
  Corporate purpose 32.76      31.67      32.90      
  Debt repayment 24.33      22.10      17.70      
  Working capital 18.50      25.90      17.80      
  Other 20.00      15.67      27.90      
Industry of the borrower
  Financial services 7.20        5.83        7.71        
  General manufacturing 12.65      13.59      10.37      
  Healthcare 7.10        8.04        5.33        
  Oil and gas 5.21        5.89        8.88        
  Retail & supermarkets 7.70        6.79        6.49        
  Technology 9.59        11.98      3.72        
  Other 50.50      47.80      57.20      
Table I
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Loan and borrower characteristics
Loans to borrowers that are
Very opaque Semi opaque Transparent
This table presents summary statistics for a sample of 17,839 syndicated loan deals to 8,701 borrowers signed between 1986 and 2007. Borrowers are classified into three categories
based on their opactiy. A transparent borrower has both, a S&P senior debt rating and a ticker. A very opaque borrower has neither a rating nor a ticker. The remaining borrowers are
categorized as semi opaque because they have either a rating or a ticker. The 8,701 different borrowers in our sample are divided into three groups of small, mid-sized, and large borrowers
based on their sales size with each group containing either 2,900 or 2,901 borrowers. The 17,839 loans are arranged by 1,080 different lead arrangers. These lead arrangers are categorized
into top-, mid- and low-reputation arrangers based on their annual market share with each group containing 360 arrangers. The top-100 lead arrangers include those 100 arrangers with the
highest market share. Panel A reports general borrower and loan characteristics whereas Panel B reports information about the syndicate structure. Variable definitions can be found in
Table A-I of the appendix. The unit of observation is the deal level. 
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Panel B: Syndicate structure characteristics
Number 
of loans Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Number 
of loans Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Number of 
loans Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Number of participants 5,038 2.06 0.00 4.24 7,430 2.22 0.00 4.21 5,371 7.76 6.00 8.33
Total number of lenders 5,038 3.13 1.00 4.28 7,430 3.28 1.00 4.24 5,371 8.95 7.00 8.43
Market share of lead arranger (%)
  Average market share across all lead arrangers in syndicate 5,038 0.54 0.03 1.50 7,430 0.67 0.04 1.62 5,371 1.18 0.40 1.94
Lending share of lead arranger (%)
  All loans & all lead arrangers 5,038 69.35 100.00 35.18 7,430 65.71 71.43 35.81 5,371 27.67 16.67 27.39
  Loans arranged by top-20 lead arrangers 1,394 56.48 50.00 35.46 2,144 53.71 44.44 35.74 2,615 24.60 14.67 24.87
  Loans arranged by top-100 lead arrangers 2,023 62.34 59.22 36.52 3,132 56.69 50.00 36.27 3,412 24.37 14.29 24.76
  Loans arranged by top-reputation lead arrangers 2,648 65.33 70.00 35.97 4,002 59.97 50.00 36.40 3,837 24.67 14.64 25.00
  Loans arranged by mid-reputation lead arrangers 1,078 74.99 100.00 33.60 1,499 73.00 100.00 33.60 678 36.48 23.89 32.03
  Loans arranged by low-reputation lead arrangers 1,344 72.75 100.00 33.86 1,939 71.92 100.00 34.16 867 34.06 21.31 30.77
  Loans raised by small borrowers 2,547 86.70 100.00 25.72 3,066 86.13 100.00 26.20 251 49.99 36.00 34.13
  Loans raised by mid-sized borrowers 1,726 58.18 50.00 34.02 2,824 59.31 50.00 34.05 1,330 38.01 26.08 30.74
  Loans raised by large borrowers 797 38.07 25.00 32.32 1,550 36.99 25.00 31.00 3,801 22.59 13.50 23.63
Concentration of the syndicate (HHI)
  All loans & all lead arrangers 5,038 8,550 10,000 2,584 7,430 8,196 10,000 2,891 5,371 5,091 4,624 3,372
  Loans arranged by top-20 lead arrangers 1,394 4,871 3,025 4,282 2,144 4,449 2,500 4,248 2,615 1,454 256 2,821
  Loans arranged by top-100 lead arrangers 2,023 8,169 10,000 2,759 3,132 7,626 10,000 3,148 3,412 4,735 4,064 3,330
  Loans arranged by top-reputation lead arrangers 2,648 8,300 10,000 2,725 4,002 7,810 10,000 3,091 3,837 4,686 3,949 3,327
  Loans arranged by mid-reputation lead arrangers 1,078 8,937 10,000 2,256 1,499 8,730 10,000 2,503 678 6,093 6,400 3,293
  Loans arranged by low-reputation lead arrangers 1,344 8,734 10,000 2,492 1,939 8,581 10,000 2,615 867 6,098 6,566 3,255
  Loans raised by small borrowers 2,547 9,411 10,000 1,833 3,066 9,463 10,000 1,741 251 7,304 8,356 3,106
  Loans raised by mid-sized borrowers 1,726 8,168 10,000 2,711 2,824 7,979 10,000 2,906 1,330 6,176 6,469 3,326
  Loans raised by large borrowers 797 6,628 7,079 3,080 1,550 6,087 6,543 3,322 3,801 4,565 3,851 3,253
Table I (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Loans to borrowers that are
"Highly opaque" "Semi opaque" "Transparent"
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Very opaqueD 3.34 ***
3.80
Semi opaqueD 2.62 ***
3.39
OpaqueD 2.70 *** 8.63 *** 3.77 *** 3.67 *** 4.34 *** 4.34 *** 3.25 ***
3.75 10.09 4.46 4.36 4.94 4.94 3.27
Previous borrower (PB#,5) -1.24 *** 0.42 0.34 0.38 0.72 1.16 *
-2.59 0.76 0.62 0.69 1.27 1.92
PB#,5*opaqueD -2.00 ** -1.92 ** -1.94 ** -1.88 ** -2.64 ***
-2.49 -2.39 -2.43 -2.35 -3.08
Lead arranger reputation (LR) -77.87 *** -41.91 ** -43.20 ** -46.56 **
-7.32 -1.96 -2.02 -2.19
LR*opaque -63.14 *** -63.97 *** -57.53 **
-2.65 -2.69 -2.42
Former lead (FLD,5) -1.62 *** -3.61 ***
-3.05 -4.69
FLD,5*opaque 3.19 ***
2.98
Borrower size -0.70 ** -0.73 *** 1.61 *** -0.69 ** -0.63 ** -0.64 ** -0.64 ** -0.64 **
-2.53 -2.64 5.14 -2.49 -2.28 -2.31 -2.33 -2.35
Loan size -22.26 *** -22.24 *** -4.84 *** -22.23 *** -22.09 *** -22.03 *** -22.00 *** -22.00 ***
-49.41 -49.42 -5.18 -49.52 -49.25 -49.20 -49.25 -49.41
Loan size*midD -2.91 *** -2.94 *** -14.32 *** -2.92 *** -2.91 *** -2.92 *** -2.91 *** -2.88 ***
-5.39 -5.46 -17.02 -5.42 -5.06 -5.01 -4.98 -4.94
Loan size*largeD 15.03 *** 15.00 *** 1.35 14.95 *** 14.99 *** 14.92 *** 14.90 *** 14.93 ***
32.09 32.12 1.53 31.95 32.19 31.97 31.97 31.99
Loan maturity -4.53 *** -4.54 *** -1.69 *** -4.57 *** -4.52 *** -4.52 *** -4.54 *** -4.55 ***
-10.07 -10.08 -3.43 -10.15 -10.07 -10.06 -10.13 -10.17
Term loanD 5.82 *** 5.88 *** 7.66 *** 5.88 *** 5.85 *** 5.85 *** 5.82 *** 5.82 ***
6.33 6.41 7.52 6.41 6.18 6.14 6.11 6.12
Multiple tranchesD -0.02 -0.03 -0.37 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06
-0.03 -0.04 -0.54 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.152 0.150 0.151 0.151 0.152 0.152 0.153
Number of observations 17,839 17,839 17,839 17,839 17,839 17,839 17,839 17,839
Table II
Main Effects of Information Asymmetry
Lead arranger's lending share
(2) (3)
This table presents tobit regression results. The dependent variable is the lead arranger’s lending share defined as the average lending share across all
lead arrangers who participate in the loan’s syndicate. The independent variables are defined in Table A-I of the appendix. Subscript D indicates a
dummy variable. All regressions include loan purpose, loan size, borrower industry and year dummies. For each independent variable, the top row
reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the t-statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the
borrower-level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
(4) (7) (8)(5)(1) (6)
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OpaqueD 2.51 *** 2.72 *** 3.25 ***
2.70 2.81 3.27
Previous borrower (PB#,1) 1.91
1.55
PB#,1*opaqueD -1.92
-1.22
Previous borrower (PB#,3) 0.67
0.97
PB#,3*opaqueD -1.74 *
-1.78
Previous borrower (PB#,5) 1.16 *
1.92
PB#,5*opaqueD -2.64 ***
-3.08
Lead arranger reputation (LR) -46.19 ** -46.55 ** -46.56 **
-2.16 -2.18 -2.19
LR*opaque -59.34 ** -58.21 ** -57.53 **
-2.50 -2.45 -2.42
Former lead (FLD,5) -3.42 *** -3.34 *** -3.61 ***
-4.39 -4.30 -4.69
FLD,5*opaque 2.47 ** 2.72 ** 3.19 ***
2.28 2.52 2.98
Borrower size -0.68 ** -0.65 ** -0.64 **
-2.52 -2.40 -2.35
Loan size -21.98 *** -22.01 *** -22.00 ***
-49.38 -49.36 -49.41
Loan size*midD -2.90 *** -2.89 *** -2.88 ***
-4.97 -4.94 -4.94
Loan size*largeD 14.96 *** 14.97 *** 14.93 ***
32.13 32.04 31.99
Loan maturity -4.50 *** -4.56 *** -4.55 ***
-10.12 -10.18 -10.17
Term loanD 5.80 *** 5.82 *** 5.82 ***
6.09 6.12 6.12
Multiple tranchesD -0.09 -0.07 -0.06
-0.14 -0.12 -0.10
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.150 0.150
Number of observations 17,839 17,839 17,839
This table presents tobit regression results. The dependent variable is the lead arranger’s
lending share defined as the average lending share across all lead arrangers who
participate in the loan’s syndicate. The independent variables are defined in Table A-I of
the appendix. Subscript D indicates a dummy variable. All regressions include loan
purpose, loan size, borrower industry and year dummies. For each independent variable,
the top row reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the t-statistic.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower-level. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Table III
Borrower Reputation
Lead arranger's lending share
(1) (2) (3)
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OpaqueD 2.60 *** 2.87 *** 3.17 ** 3.15 ***
2.78 2.95 3.16 3.12
Previous borrower (PBD,1) 1.93 * 1.92
1.87 1.64
PBD,1*opaqueD -2.64 * -3.40 **
-1.89 -2.26
Previous borrower (PBD,3) 0.71
0.83
PBD,3*opaqueD -2.38 **
-2.14
Previous borrower (PBD,5) 0.84
0.97
PBD,5*opaqueD -2.81 ***
-2.57
Previous borrower (PBD,2+3 only) -0.27
-0.28
PBD,2+3 only*opaqueD -2.10
-1.58
Previous borrower (PBD,4+5 only) 0.79
0.63
PBD,4+5 only*opaqueD -3.10 *
-1.71
Lead arranger reputation (LR) -46.37 ** -47.03 ** -46.75 ** -46.90 **
-2.17 -2.21 -2.20 -2.20
LR*opaque -59.20 ** -57.41 ** -58.84 ** -56.93 **
-2.49 -2.42 -2.48 -2.40
Former lead (FLD,5) -3.49 *** -3.33 *** -3.09 *** -3.47 ***
-4.49 -4.20 -4.44 -4.27
FLD,5*opaque 2.66 ** 2.88 *** 2.13 ** 3.10 ***
2.47 2.62 2.15 2.78
Borrower size -0.68 ** -0.65 ** -0.67 ** -0.64 **
-2.50 -2.37 -2.42 -2.36
Loan size -21.99 *** -22.01 *** -22.00 *** -21.97 ***
-49.41 -49.31 -49.29 -49.38
Loan size*midD -2.88 *** -2.88 *** -2.90 *** -2.89 ***
-4.94 -4.94 -4.97 -4.95
Loan size*largeD 14.98 *** 14.98 *** 14.99 *** 14.94 ***
32.19 32.20 32.23 32.08
Loan maturity -4.51 *** -4.56 *** -4.55 *** -4.52 ***
-10.12 -10.20 -10.14 -10.13
Term loanD 5.79 *** 5.81 *** 5.84 *** 5.78 ***
6.08 6.10 6.14 6.08
Multiple tranchesD -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09
-0.11 -0.15 -0.13 -0.15
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
Number of observations 17,839 17,839 17,839 17,839
This table presents tobit regression results. The dependent variable is the lead arranger’s lending share
defined as the average lending share across all lead arrangers who participate in the loan’s syndicate. The
independent variables are defined in Table A-I of the appendix. Subscript D indicates a dummy variable. All
regressions include loan purpose, loan size, borrower industry and year dummies. For each independent
variable, the top row reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the t-statistic. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower-level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
(4)
Table IV
Borrower Reputation
Lead arranger's lending share
(1) (2) (3)
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OpaqueD 3.25 *** 3.24 *** 3.16 *** 3.18 ***
3.27 3.25 3.15 3.19
Previous borrower (PB#,5) 1.16 * 1.16 * 1.05 * 1.15 *
1.92 1.92 1.74 1.92
PB#,5*opaqueD -2.64 *** -2.65 *** -2.56 *** -2.73 ***
-3.08 -3.08 -2.99 -3.18
Lead arranger reputation (LR) -46.56 ** -43.96 ** -15.64 -38.91 *
-2.19 -2.00 -0.70 -1.81
High-reputation arrangers (LRhigh,D) -0.38
-0.55
Top-100 arrangers (LR100,D) -2.93 ***
-3.64
Top-20 arrangers (LR20,D) -2.07 ***
-3.31
LR*opaque -57.53 ** -54.55 ** -56.94 ** -44.60 *
-2.42 -2.29 -2.36 -1.87
Former lead (FLD,5) -3.61 *** -3.60 *** -2.64 *** -3.58 ***
-4.69 -4.69 -2.87 -4.65
FLD,5*opaque 3.19 *** 3.73 *** 2.86 *** 4.27 ***
2.98 2.93 2.65 3.74
FLD,5*opaque*LRhigh,D -0.95
-0.82
FLD,5*opaque*LR100,D -1.67 *
-1.69
FLD,5*opaque*LR20,D -3.31 ***
-2.78
Borrower size -0.64 ** -0.64 ** -0.63 ** -0.57 **
-2.35 -2.32 -2.31 -2.08
Loan size -22.00 *** -21.98 *** -21.83 *** -21.92 ***
-49.41 -49.24 -49.07 -49.26
Loan size*midD -2.88 -2.89 -2.93 -2.91
-4.94 -4.95 -5.02 -4.98
Loan size*largeD 14.93 14.92 14.84 14.84
31.99 31.91 31.95 31.80
Loan maturity -4.55 *** -4.55 *** -4.53 *** -4.57 ***
-10.17 -10.16 -10.13 -10.22
Term loanD 5.82 *** 5.82 *** 5.79 *** 5.85 ***
6.12 6.12 6.09 6.15
Multiple tranchesD -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05
-0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.158 0.158 0.158
Number of observations 17,839 17,839 17,839 17,839
This table presents tobit regression results. The dependent variable is the lead arranger’s lending share defined
as the average lending share across all lead arrangers who participate in the loan’s syndicate. The independent
variables are defined in Table A-I of the appendix. Subscript D indicates a dummy variable. All regressions
include loan purpose, loan size, borrower industry and year dummies. For each independent variable, the top
row reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the t-statistic. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered on the borrower-level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
(3)(2)
Table V
Moral Hazard versus Adverse Selection
Lead arranger's lending share
(1) (4)
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OpaqueD 4.03 *** 3.64 *** 3.25 *** 3.91 ***
4.55 4.03 3.27 4.26
Previous borrower (PB#,5) 0.87 1.22 ** 1.16 * 1.31 **
1.49 2.00 1.92 2.06
PB#,5*opaqueD -2.57 *** -2.86 *** -2.64 *** -2.95 ***
-3.04 -3.27 -3.08 -3.29
Lead arranger reputation (LR) -42.16 ** -44.68 ** -46.56 ** -42.98 **
-1.97 -2.09 -2.19 -2.01
LR*opaque -61.81 *** -58.94 ** -57.53 ** -61.17
-2.60 -2.48 -2.42 -2.57
Former lead (FLD,1) -3.07 *** -3.02 ***
-3.99 -3.96
FLD,1*opaque 3.75 *** 3.69 ***
3.19 3.15
Former lead (FLD,3) -3.93 ***
-5.15
FLD,3*opaque 4.10 ***
3.70
Former lead (FLD,5) -3.61 ***
-4.69
FLD,5*opaque 3.19 ***
2.98
Former lead (FLD,2+3 only) -1.19 ***
-3.36
FLD,2+3 only*opaque 1.07 **
2.05
Former lead (FLD,4+5 only) 0.45
1.07
FLD,4+5 only*opaque -0.48
-0.86
Borrower size -0.63 ** -0.63 ** -0.64 ** -0.64 **
-2.31 -2.30 -2.35 -2.34
Loan size -22.02 *** -22.00 *** -22.00 *** -21.98 ***
-49.29 -49.35 -49.41 -49.27
Loan size*midD -2.92 *** -2.91 *** -2.88 *** -2.93 ***
-5.00 -4.99 -4.94 -5.02
Loan size*largeD 14.94 *** 14.94 *** 14.93 *** 14.93 ***
32.06 32.06 31.99 32.09
Loan maturity -4.55 *** -4.58 *** -4.55 *** -4.56 ***
-10.13 -10.20 -10.17 -10.17
Term loanD 5.86 *** 5.87 *** 5.82 *** 5.87 ***
6.15 6.17 6.12 6.17
Multiple tranchesD -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06
-0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.152 0.151 0.151
Number of observations 17,839 17,839 17,839 17,839
This table presents tobit regression results. The dependent variable is the lead arranger’s lending share
defined as the average lending share across all lead arrangers who participate in the loan’s syndicate.
The independent variables are defined in Table A-I of the appendix. Subscript D indicates a dummy
variable. All regressions include loan purpose, loan size, borrower industry and year dummies. For
each independent variable, the top row reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the
t-statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower-level. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
(3) (4)
Table VI
Borrower-Lead Arranger Relationship
Lead arranger's lending share
(1) (2)
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(7) (8)
OpaqueD 3.25 *** 3.18 *** 5.07 *** 5.01 *** 3.33 *** 3.25 *** 14.28 *** 14.15 *** 2.47 ** 2.35 **
3.27 3.19 5.33 5.28 3.17 3.10 13.46 13.41 2.32 2.21
Previous borrower (PB#,5) 1.16 * 1.15 * 0.90 * 0.90 1.13 * 1.12 * 1.32 * 1.31 * -0.31 -0.33
1.92 1.92 1.66 1.65 1.76 1.75 1.91 1.90 -0.50 -0.52
PB#,5*opaqueD -2.64 *** -2.73 *** -2.58 *** -2.64 *** -2.43 *** -2.51 *** -4.92 *** -5.09 *** -1.68 * -1.77 **
-3.08 -3.18 -3.12 -3.19 -2.70 -2.79 -5.07 -5.24 -1.86 -1.96
Lead arranger reputation (LR) -46.56 ** -38.91 * -49.36 *** -45.83 ** -46.26 ** -37.97 -52.82 ** -42.90 * -48.62 *** -39.43 **
-2.19 -1.81 -2.70 -2.49 -2.01 -1.64 -2.04 -1.65 -3.04 -2.44
LR*opaque -57.53 ** -44.60 * -62.72 ** -55.16 ** -56.31 ** -43.22 * -208.22 *** -183.30 *** -83.06 *** -70.60 ***
-2.42 -1.87 -2.44 -2.14 -2.23 -1.70 -5.73 -5.05 -4.27 -3.61
Former lead (FLD,5) -3.61 *** -3.58 *** -2.48 *** -2.46 *** -3.73 *** -3.70 *** -2.40 *** -2.39 *** -3.45 *** -3.40 ***
-4.69 -4.65 -3.50 -3.48 -4.57 -4.53 -2.97 -2.96 -4.38 -4.32
FLD,5*opaque 3.19 *** 4.27 *** 1.84 * 2.75 ** 3.02 *** 4.11 *** 2.02 * 4.07 *** 2.33 ** 3.17 ***
2.98 3.74 1.75 2.41 2.68 3.43 1.81 3.39 2.04 2.61
Top-20 arrangers (LR20,D) -2.07 *** -0.96 * -2.21 *** -2.65 *** -2.31 ***
-3.31 -1.72 -3.36 -3.87 -3.58
FLD,5*opaque*LR20,D -3.31 *** -2.48 ** -3.33 *** -6.64 *** -2.49 **
-2.78 -2.15 -2.68 -4.95 -1.96
Borrower size -0.64 ** -0.57 ** 0.32 0.35 -0.59 ** -0.51 * 2.24 *** 2.32 *** -1.03 *** -0.95 ***
-2.35 -2.08 1.16 1.30 -1.98 -1.72 8.63 8.89 -3.53 -3.25
Loan size -22.00 *** -21.92 *** 3.88 *** 3.86 *** -21.74 *** -21.68 *** -0.39 -0.43 -14.87 *** -14.85 ***
-49.41 -49.26 9.50 9.45 -45.84 -45.75 -1.05 -1.16 -33.12 -33.07
Loan size*midD -2.88 *** -2.91 *** -19.08 *** -19.03 *** -3.04 *** -3.04 *** -14.32 *** -14.27 *** 0.35 0.37
-4.94 -4.98 -26.41 -26.31 -4.98 -4.99 -20.52 -20.53 0.53 0.55
Loan size*largeD 14.93 *** 14.84 *** -11.97 *** -11.95 *** 14.77 *** 14.70 *** 2.63 *** 2.50 *** 8.15 *** 8.13 ***
31.99 31.80 -23.03 -23.03 29.98 29.85 4.63 4.45 17.24 17.18
Loan maturity -4.55 *** -4.57 *** -2.76 *** -2.79 *** -4.52 *** -4.54 *** 1.73 *** 1.69 *** -3.87 *** -3.88 ***
-10.17 -10.22 -5.89 -5.96 -9.55 -9.59 3.73 3.65 -8.84 -8.86
Term loanD 5.82 *** 5.85 *** 4.48 *** 4.50 *** 5.80 *** 5.82 *** 6.38 *** 6.35 *** 3.04 *** 3.04 ***
6.12 6.15 4.54 4.56 5.90 5.93 6.10 6.09 3.73 3.74
Multiple tranchesD -0.06 -0.05 1.42 ** 1.44 ** 0.00 0.01 -0.73 -0.71 -4.72 *** -4.67 ***
-0.10 -0.08 2.37 2.40 0.00 0.01 -1.04 -1.01 -6.91 -6.85
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.158 0.158 0.164 0.151 0.152 0.164 0.164 0.162 0.162
Number of observations 17,839 17,839 12,511 12,511 16,633 16,633 13,782 13,782 23,588 23,588
Excluding project finance 
loans, club deals and 
loans to financial 
institutions Tranche level analysis
Lead arranger's lending share
Robustness Checks Regarding the Composition of the Sample
Table VII
(9) (10)(4)(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
This table presents tobit regression results. The dependent variable is the lead arranger’s lending share defined as the average lending share across all lead arrangers who
participate in the loan’s syndicate. The independent variables are defined in Table A-I of the appendix. Subscript D indicates a dummy variable. All regressions include loan
purpose, loan size, borrower industry and year dummies. For each independent variable, the top row reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the t-statistic.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower-level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Sample period from 1992 
to 2007 onlyBenchmark Excluding sole lenders
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Dependent variables Description
Lead arranger's lending share
Independent variables Description
Very opaqueD
Semi opaqueD
OpaqueD
TransparentD
Previous borrower (PB#,i)
Previous borrower (PBD,i)
Previous borrower (PBD,i+j only)
Lead arranger reputation (LR)
High-reputation arrangers (LRhigh,D)
Top-100 arrangers (LR100,D)
Top-20 arrangers (LR20,D)
Former leadD (FLD,i)
Former leadD (FLD,i+j only)
Borrower size Natural logarithm of the borrower's sales volume in millions of dollars at the time of loan signing.
Loan size Natural logarithm of the deal amount in millions of dollar.
MidD
LargeD
Loan maturity Natural logarithm of average maturity across all tranches belonging to the same deal, measured in days.
Term loanD Dummy=1 if at least one tranche in the deal is a term loan.
Multiple trancheD Dummy=1 if the deal consists of more than one tranche.
Year dummies
Loan purpose dummies
Industry dummies
Dummies indicating the different reasons why borrowers raised funds based on Dealscan's "Primary Loan Purpose" field. Individual 
dummies for acquisition, corporate purpose, and debt repayment are created. The dummy for working capital is excluded as the benchmark 
loan purpose.
Dummies for the industry of the borrower based on Dealscan's "Major Industry Group" field. Individual dummies for financial services, 
general manufacturing, healthcare, oil and gas, retail & supermarkets, and technology are created. The dummy for aerospace is excluded as 
the benchmark industry.
Dummy=1 for loans that belong to the mid-33% of the sample in terms of loan size for any particular year. 
Variable Definitions
Percentage share kept by lead arranger (1 = 1%). In case of multiple lead arrangers, the average across all lead arrangers is used.
Dummy = 1 if the borrower has no S&P senior debt rating and no ticker.
Dummy = 1 if the borrower has either a S&P senior debt rating or a ticker.
Dummy = 1 if the borrower is either very or semi opaque.
The natural log of number of prior loans rasied by a borrower in the i= 1, 3, or 5 years prior to loan signing.
Dummy=1 if if the lead arranger has been a lead arranger to the same borrower in the i=1, 3, or 5 years prior to loan signing.
Dummy=1 for loans that belong to the top-33% of the sample in terms of loan size for any particular year. 
Dummies indicating in which year the loan was signed. Individual dummies for each year from 1986 to 2007 are created. The dummy for 
year 1986 is excluded as the benchmark year.
Dummy=1 if lead arranger has been a lead arranger to the same borrower in i+j years prior to loan signing. We consider (1) i+j=2+3 when 
the lead arranger has been a lead arranger to the same borrower 2 or 3 years prior but not 1 year prior, and (2)  i+j=4+5 when the lead 
arrnager has been a lead arrnger to the same borrower 4 or 5 years prior to loan signing but not 1 to 3 years prior.
Dummy=1 if lead arranger belongs to the top-20 lead arrangers with respect to market share.
Table A-I
Dummy=1 if lead arranger belongs to the top-100 lead arrangers with respect to market share.
Dummy = 1 if the borrower has both a S&P senior debt rating and a ticker.
Dummy=1 if lead arranger belongs to the top 33% of lead arrangers with respect to market share.
Lead arranger reputation measured by the market share of the lead arranger in the year prior to loan signing (0.01=1%).
Dummy=1 if the borrower raised at least one other loan in the i+j years prior to loan signing. We consider (1) i+j=2+3 when the borrower 
raised a loan 2 or 3 years prior to loan signing but not 1 year prior, and (2)  i+j=4+5 when the borrower raised a loan 4 or 5 years prior to 
loan signing but not 1 to 3 years prior.
Dummy=1 if the borrower raised at least one other loan in the i= 1, 3, or 5 years prior to loan signing.
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Lead arrangers Market Share
JP Morgan Chase 10.56
Bank of America 9.20
Citigroup 6.33
Wells Fargo 5.97
Chemical 5.57
Chase Manhattan 4.45
Wachovia Corp 4.03
Deutsche 3.53
Merrill Lynch 3.30
Royal Bank of Canada 2.82
US Bancorp 2.28
Credit Suisse 2.26
PNC 1.95
BNP Paribas 1.86
Barclays 1.78
General Electric Capital Corp 1.67
Lehman Brothers 1.51
Goldman Sachs 1.42
Bank of New York 1.09
Bank of Montreal 0.77
Total 72.38
Table A-II
League Table for the Top-20 Lead Arrangers from 1986 
to 2007
This table shows the market shares of the 20 most-
reputable lead arrangers. Market shares are based on the
loan volume arranged by the lead arranger in the syndicated
loan market between 1986 and 2007.
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Maximum Minimum Mean 
Mean 
excluding 
zeros
Standard 
deviation
Loans raised by the borrower
  Number of loans in 5 years prior to loan signing 32 0 1.01 2.44 1.73
  Number of loans in 3 years prior to loan signing 31 0 0.73 2.05 1.34
  Number of loans in 1 year prior to loan signing 12 0 0.30 1.55 0.75
Loans raised by the borrower with the same lead arranger
  Number of loans in 5 years prior to loan signing 15 0 1.00 2.25 1.60
  Number of loans in 3 years prior to loan signing 14 0 0.71 1.95 1.25
  Number of loans in 1 year prior to loan signing 12 0 0.29 1.52 0.73
Borrowers' History in the Syndicated Loan Market
Table A-III
Number of prior loans
This table presents summary statistics for our sample of 17,839 syndicated loan deals.
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